The objecti ve of the paper is to analyse the impact of the Swiss Nati onal Bank's decision to introduce the fl oati ng exchange rate of the franc on January 15th, 2015, upon the market value of commercial banks operati ng in the Polish banking sector. The analysis involved twelve commercial banks quoted on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The results are inconclusive. The predicted reducti on of the banks' market value was less signifi cant than indicated by market investors' reacti on on the day aft er the announcement of the decision to introduce the fl oati ng exchange rate of the franc. The banks most prone to granti ng credit denominated in CHF did experience the largest reducti on of their share quotati ons. However, the Pearson product-moment correlati on coeffi cient calculated for the correlati on between the average cumulati ve abnormal returns on shares for the enti re analysed sample, and the proporti on of credits denominated in Swiss francs in the total credit portf olio, indicated only a moderate correlati on between both variables.
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I
The unexpected decision of the Swiss Nati onal Bank, which on January 15th, 2015 abandoned the policy of maintaining a fi xed exchange rate to the euro at the level of 1,2, and at the same ti me decided to reduce interest rates from -0,25% to -0,75%, once again illustrated how ti ghtly connected the fi nancial and capital markets of individual countries are. The decision led to rapid appreciati on of the Swiss franc exchange rates in relati on to other currencies, including the Polish zloty. The strengthening of the franc completely reoriented the existi ng percepti on of foreign currency credits and loans in Poland (and in parti cular mortgages), and exposed the dangers of currency risk, both to the banks and to their clients (Buszko, 2016, p. 129-145) . The objecti ve of this arti cle is to analyse the infl uence of the decision to introduce the fl oati ng exchange rate of the Swiss franc upon the market value of commercial banks operati ng in the Polish banking sector. The analysis included twelve commercial banks quoted on the Warsaw Stock Exchange.
T -
Although up to the present it has been very diffi cult to provide a uniform defi niti on of the risk phenomenon, the revoluti onary theory by F. H. Knight (who was the fi rst to defi ne risk as a measurable value) was a seminal point leading to his syntheti c defi niti on (Knight, 1921) . Risk is usually defi ned as the danger of not achieving the desired result (the negati ve concept of risk), or the possibility of obtaining a result diff erent from expected -the neutral concept (Jajuga, 2007, p. 13) . Market risk is the danger of reducti on of a bank's income or its net value, as a result of unfavourable changes of interest rates, exchange rates or security prices (Figure 1.) Market risk is the risk of a change in the value of a fi nancial positi on or portf olio due to the changes in the value of the underlying components upon which that portf olio depends (McNeil, Frey & Embrechts, p. 5) . One of the most important types of risk accompanying banking operati ons, which is a part of market risk, is the currency risk. It is defi ned as the probability of loss caused by changes in currency exchange rates. The risk grows along with: 1) higher variability of exchange rates, 2) higher mismatch between the currency receivables and liabiliti es in a bank's balance sheet.
The process of managing this type of risk includes its identi fi cati on, quanti fi cati on, monitoring, reporti ng and control. The main tools for currency risk management include: 1) internal procedures for managing this type of risk, 2) models and measurements of currency risk, 3) limits and threshold values concerning currency risk, 4) limits for acceptable currency transacti ons and for the exchange rates applied during those transacti ons.
The main task of currency risk management conducted by any bank is to limit the impact of variability of market factors upon the potenti al changes in the bank's profi t. The bank's board defi nes the currency risk profi le, which must be in line with the prevailing overall strategy e-Finanse" 2015, vol. 11 / nr 4 Zbigniew Korzeb e in uence of currency risk upon the market value of commercial banks operating in the Polish banking sector and targets, and within the predefi ned level of acceptable risk. The objecti ve of such an early warning system is to shape the currency structure of the balance sheet and offbalance sheet items in such a way that it remains within the external and internal limits. Those limits consti tute a cap for the maximum level of gross open currency positi ons, and determine the acceptable thresholds disaggregated for individual currencies in the defi ned areas (bank portf olio -trading portf olio, currencies). The limits are monitored at the end of, as well as during, the working day. Risk limits are periodically reviewed to match the prevailing macro-and microeconomic situati on.
The bank systemati cally evaluates the infl uence of unfavourable changes of currency exchange rates upon its long-term profi ts. The infl uence can result from unfavourable rates of currency conversion of the bank's future incomes and costs in other currencies. A bank's exposure to currency risk is measured with the use of the Value at Risk (VaR) model. The method measures the largest expected loss that the insti tuti on can suff er in a given period, assuming normal market conditi ons and a set level of confi dence (Choudhry, 2013, p. 30) . Calculati ng risk according to Value at Risk means calculati ng the value of the asset portf olio exposed to risk with a given probability, within a given ti me horizon. Usually banks calculate daily loss, which can occur with probability not higher than 1%. The value of VaR is calculated by historical simulati on, on the basis of several years of observati on of the dynamics of market risk factors, or by the variance/covariance method. Esti mati ng the infl uence of changes of the market factors upon the current value of a parti cular portf olio is carried out by full revaluati on (comparing departure of real return rates from the value of those expected, forecasted on the basis parameters of a historically esti mated trend).
Stress testi ng analysis is used as a supplementary and verifying method of esti mati ng the Value at Risk. The method evaluates the infl uence of unexpected fl uctuati ons of market conditi ons upon the bank's profi t (VaR is not recommended in those cases). The scenarios assume rapid and signifi cant changes of risk factors, leading to extreme conditi ons -currency shocks.
Another way of limiti ng currency risk is the practi ce of closing every major currency positi on with an opposite transacti on on the market (Hull, 2014, p. 542) . During the durati on of hedging, the bank measures the eff ecti veness of the hedging methods applied. The change of the fair value of hedging instruments is entered in the "capital from revaluati on", as the amount to which the hedging is eff ecti ve. The ineff ecti ve part of the hedging is entered into the profi t and loss account in the part "profi t from fi nancial instruments at fair value through profi t or loss". The eff ecti ve part, collected in the capital from revaluati on, is subject to gradual reclassifi cati on (depreciati on) according to the ti metable developed by the bank, into the profi t and loss account, unti l the original portf olio expires (Chance & Brooks, 2015, p. 566) .
Measuring currency risk is also necessary in order to calculate the currency risk-related capital requirement. According to the CRR directi ve, it can be calculated according to the basic method or the internal models method, providing the credit insti tuti on obtains approval from the appropriate organ (Koleśnik, 2014, p. 144) .
M
The conducted research uti lised the market model involving determinati on of the parameters of the linear regression line for each of the analysed banks. The parameters refl ected the relati on between the rate of return on shares of a parti cular bank and the rate of return on the stock exchange index in the period preceding the offi cial announcement of the informati on concerning the decision of the Swiss Nati onal Bank to introduce the fl oati ng exchange rate of the franc on January 15 th , 2015. The method is based on a measurement of additi onal rate of return: the Cumulati ve Abnormal Returns (CAR). Eugene F. Fama was the fi rst to present the concept of event study in 1969. The model, also described as abnormal returns method, consists of comparing departure of real return rates from the value of those expected, forecasted on the basis parameters of a historically esti mated trend (Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, 1969) . For the purpose of this paper it has been accepted that the term 'event' means the publishing of the offi cial informati on by the Swiss Nati onal Bank.
The essence of event analysis is calculati ng additi onal rate of return of the company's shares, i.e. the diff erence between real and expected rate of return on bank assets, if the event did not occur:
( 1) where:
"e-Finanse" 2015, vol. 11 / nr 4 Zbigniew Korzeb e in uence of currency risk upon the market value of commercial banks operating in the Polish banking sector additi onal rate of return on shares of i-th company achieved on day t, real rate of return on shares of i-th company achieved on day t in case of informati on, expected rate of return on shares of i-th company achieved on day t in case the informati on did not happen, where N means the number of sampled companies.
Expected rate of return on shares of i-th company is based on the assumpti on of a constant and linear relati on between individual asset returns and the return of a market index WIG-banks (the single index model): (2) with and where: the intercept and the slope of the regression of E(R it ) regressed against R M,t -rates of return on the market portf olio (WIG-banks index).
Measurements of additi onal rate of return used in research are Cumulati ve Abnormal Returns (CAR) and Buy-and-Hold-Abnormal Returns (BHAR). Abnormal Returns are the crucial measure to assess the impact of an event. The abnormal return of fi rm i and event date t is defi ned as the diff erence of the realized return and the expected return given the absence of the event. Cumulati ve Abnormal Returns CAR iT is calculated as the sum of daily abnormal rates of return from successive session days in the analyzed period T:
where:
cumulati ve abnormal returns on shares of i-th company on day t, period of observati on, ti me frame measured in session days, abnormal returns of i-th company shares on day t.
Recently, especially aft er Ikenberry's, Lakonishok's and Vermaelen's (1995) and Barber's and Lyon's (1997) publicati ons, buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR iT ) have gained considerable importance. It is calculated as a diff erence between rate of return on investments in bank shares in period T and expected rate of return: (4) where:
buy-and-hold abnormal returns on shares over the period T, period of observati on, ti me frame measured in session days, real rate of return on shares of i-th company on day t if there was an informati on, expected rate of return on shares of i-th company if there was no informati on.
The average of cumulati ve abnormal returns for the whole analyzed sample is calculated as an arithmeti cal mean of individual banks' cumulati ve rates of return: Whereas the average of cumulati ve buy-and-hold abnormal returns with N shares in period T is defi ned as: (6) where: the average of cumulati ve buy-and-hold rates of return on shares of banks N in period T, number of companies in the analyzed sample, buy-and-hold abnormal returns on shares of i-th company in period T.
In the analysed cases behaviour of return rates on bank shares as a reacti on to the decision of the Swiss Nati onal Bank to introduce the fl oati ng exchange rate for the franc on January 15 th , 2015 in two periods: from day t = -5 to day t = +5 session days and from day t = -30 to day "e-Finanse" 2015, vol. 11 / nr 4 Zbigniew Korzeb e in uence of currency risk upon the market value of commercial banks operating in the Polish banking sector t = +30 session days. Accepti ng such ti me horizons enables verifi cati on of the direct infl uence of such informati on on quotati ons of bank shares. In the event of applying a wider range, mistakes resulti ng from the impact of other informati on on the price of share exchange rate might arise. Esti mati ng linear regression parameters for shares of each bank was based on dependence of share return on stock exchange index return rate in the period from day t = -250 to day t = -61 session days (independent period). This period has been determined by two factors. On the one hand it cannot be too distant in ti me from the observati on period (assumpti on of parameter invariability) and on the other, it should be so distant from the date of the decision to introduce the fl oati ng exchange rate of the franc that the impact of the event on quotati ons of bank shares would be only slight.
The WIG-banks subindex has been accepted as an acti vity factor. The abnormal return on a disti nct day within the event window represents the diff erence between the actual stock return on that day and the normal return, which is predicted based on two inputs; the typical relati onship between the bank's stock and its reference index (expressed by the α and β parameters), and the actual reference market's return (WIG=banks subindex). Closing prices of bank and index share quotati ons from given stock exchange sessions were used for calculati ons.
R
Due to the relati vely small sample and its heterogeneity, the results of this research should be treated with some cauti on. The results of the conducted research are not unequivocal (Table 1) .
As would be expected, the abnormal returns are negati ve. We interpret the abnormal return as a measure of the impact of the event on the value of banks. But the predicted loss of banks' market value proved less signifi cant than may have been indicated by the reacti on of market investors on the fi rst day aft er the announcement of the Swiss Nati onal Bank's decision to introduce the fl oati ng exchange rate of the franc. However, let us note that not all commercial banks had the same proporti on of Swiss franc credits and loans in their total credit portf olios. The share of credits in francs amounted to between 0,8% and 39,75% of the total sum of credits and loans in the analysed banks, according to the state at the end of 31/12/2015. Some of the banks had much earlier resorted to granti ng currency credits only to the clients who received earnings in the foreign currency at a level appropriate for the amount of the granted credit. Therefore, there was litt le surprise that the largest reducti ons aff ected the banks most prone to granti ng CHF credits. Neither was the reducti on of the market value of those banks undisputable. The Pearson's productmoment correlati on coeffi cient calculated for the average cumulati ve abnormal returns for the analysed sample and the share of credits denominated in Swiss francs in the total credit portf olio, amounted to -0,641. This means it is only possible to state a moderate correlati on between the two variables.
The above is mainly a result of the investors deciding that the Polish banking sector is stable and resilient to external shocks. The portf olio of credits in Swiss francs is a consequence of the policy used by commercial banks in the years [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , when their main focus was selling mortgage loans denominated in the Swiss currency. It is esti mated that at the end of 2014, the value of this portf olio in the enti re banking sector amounted to almost PLN 131 billion, which consti tuted 37,2% of all housing loans, 22,4% of credits granted to households and 14,6% of the enti re credit portf olio (Polish Financial Supervision Authority [KNF], 2015).
The weakening zloty meant that borrowers (and in parti cular the 563 thousand people who took housing loans) found themselves in a situati on where the Polish zloty value of their outstanding credit rose signifi cantly. Frequently the amount they owe, expressed in the local currency, is higher now than when it was granted (in spite Source: Own research "e-Finanse" 2015, vol. 11 / nr 4 Zbigniew Korzeb e in uence of currency risk upon the market value of commercial banks operating in the Polish banking sector of repaying over a dozen or several tens of capital and interest installments). This has been a typical infl uence of the currency risk. Please note that the chief problem for most of the borrowers is the level of indebtedness in relati on to property value rather than the issue of their capability to keep up with repayments.
The nervous reacti on of the investors lasted for just one day -too short a period to draw any long-term conclusions about the infl uence of the Swiss Nati onal Bank's decision upon the market value of banks operati ng in the Polish banking sector. Nobody tries to deny that the existi ng situati on will contribute to reduced profi ts of commercial banks, which will be refl ected in their share quotati ons. The Polish zloty's weakening in relati on to the Swiss franc will contribute to less regular repayments of loans by the borrowers, whose monthly installments expressed in zlotys are now higher. This, in turn, will be refl ected in the increased specifi c reserves created by banks, and consequently it will contribute to reducti ons of capital rati os, including the most important Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1).
With the borrowers in mind, commercial banks introduced certain facilitati ons for their clients with credits indexed or denominated in the Swiss currency. Those facilitati ons included: 1) taking into account the negati ve LIBOR rates in the calculati on of interest rates when determining the size of installments, 2) reducing the CHF/PLN exchange rates at which the amounts due in zlotys are calculated (foreign exchange spreads), 3) introducing simplifi ed procedures for periods of grace in repayment of capital installments.
Since those acti ons proved insuffi cient, the propositi ons to regulate the problem were presented by the Parliament, the Commission for Banking Supervision, the main politi cal parti es, and the Polish Bank Associati on. The proposed soluti ons were very divergent in terms of the proposed methods of restructuring foreign currency housing loans, recipients of assistance and the conditi ons they must fulfi ll to receive it, as well as the parity of parti cipati on in fi nancing the costs by the parti es involved: the state treasury, the commercial banks and the borrowers. At ti mes, announcements of the most radical manners of restructuring the credits and burdening the banking sector with its costs have contributed to reducti on of bank share quotati ons, which were as profound as the one resulti ng from the announcement of the decision by the Swiss Nati onal Bank.
Those in favour of burdening the banks with the costs of currency conversion emphasise the public aspect of the situati on, in the context of percepti on of banks as insti tuti ons of public confi dence and trust. The following are among the most important arguments for this type of soluti on: 1) the banks' staff in direct contact with customers were concentrati ng on their sales targets, connected with their system of moti vati on, and very oft en they did not provide their potenti al clients with full informati on about the existi ng currency risk, 2) a retail client is not capable of evaluati ng and hedging currency risk in the same manner as professional departments of banks and the experts they employ, 3) currency loans were off ered as an alternati ve product when the borrower's creditworthiness in Polish zlotys proved insuffi cient (installments of CHF credit repayments were far smaller than in the case of analogical PLN credits), 4) banks granted credits, in which the rati o between the value of the credit and the value of its collateral (the purchased property) exceeded 100%, 5) banks ought to have been aware that the results of currency mismatch on the part of the borrower could eventually be borne by them, 6) the lack of earlier regulati ons and recommendati ons from the supervising authoriti es, concerning granti ng of currency credits and the required level of guarantees.
The opponents of the soluti on emphasise that: 1) the proposed methods of restructuring, which place the burden on one party, would lead to discriminati on in favour of the chosen group of clients, who did, aft er all, sign legally binding contracts, 2) unequal treatment of the borrowers with credits in zlotys and in foreign currencies is unfair towards the clients who acted responsibly and made an informed decision to choose the zloty loan, which meant higher cost of repayment, but no currency risk, 3) this leads to a situati on, where borrowers incurring higher risk benefi t from favourable levels of exchange rates, but in the case of an unfavourable scenario they are protected by the state, 4) no propositi on takes into account the earlier benefi ts enjoyed by the borrowers as a result of choosing the CHF loans; nor do they foresee a situati on of possible "e-Finanse" 2015, vol. 11 / nr 4 Zbigniew Korzeb e in uence of currency risk upon the market value of commercial banks operating in the Polish banking sector rapid depreciati on of the Swiss franc, which might take place in the future, 5) it is possible that the soluti on will be abused, and that the assistance received once will lead to repeated risky behaviour (parti cularly in case of the clients aware of the currency risk they incur), 6) the problem is exceedingly politi cised, which may lead to loss of public confi dence in the enti re banking system, 7) the costs of restructuring borne by the banks would contribute to their lower profi ts, and consequently to lower income tax paid into the state treasury and lower dividends for shareholders (including from banks controlled by the state), and to lower market value of commercial banks, 8) the necessary funds can be assigned towards increasing the required equity capital, which, according to the new regulati ons on capital adequacy, must be increased systemati cally, 9) foreign strategic shareholders may take legal steps against the state treasury if they decide that restructuring of currency loans breaches the conditi ons of their investment protecti on contracts.
As in many cases of this type, there are no perfect soluti ons fair to all those involved. Once again it is confi rmed that the most rati onal soluti on in case of fi nancial and capital markets is the principle of applying only the necessary regulati ons, and leaving as much market freedom as possible.
C
Regardless of which soluti on is adopted, its consequences will be signifi cant not only for the banks and borrowers, but for the enti re economy. Ill-considered acti ons may destabilise the banking system and lead to economic and fi nancial problems of the banks with a large proporti on of currency credits in their credit portf olios. Undoubtedly, this would infl uence their market value. Therefore, arriving at a rati onal compromise consti tutes a basic challenge facing not only banks and borrowers, but also the insti tuti ons of banking supervision and the bodies responsible for the fi nancial stability of the state economy.
